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THE DIFFUSION OF HR PRACTICES IN CHINESE 
WORKPLACES AND ORGANIZATIONAL OUTCOMES 
PETER GAHAN, MARCO MICHELOTTI, AND GUYSTANDINC* 
How relevant are human resource (HR) practices in economies un­
dergoing significant economic transition from a command to a mar­
ket-based system? Using data drawn from a large sample of Chinese 
establishments, the authors investigate the spread of a range of 
Western-style HR practices in China and estimate the relationship 
between the adoption of these practices and three organizational 
outcomes: sales per employee, total labor costs, and unit labor costs. 
They find a mixed result for the relationships between labor man­
agement practices and establishment productivity. While the intro­
duction of a number of HR practices was also associated with 
significantly higher labor costs, the results indicate a more mixed 
result for the relationship between these practices and unit labor 
costs. Their findings further the understanding of the relationship 
between work practices and organizational outcomes, and they help 
clarify the effects ofthe changing economic context on HR manage­
ment in China. 
From the late 1970s the Chinese government introduced a series of sweep­ing economic reforms embarking China on the road toward a market-
based economy. These reforms included changes intended to promote 
labor mobility across sectors and regions, incentives for foreign direct in­
vestment (FDI), the privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and 
the promotion of domestic private firms. A critical element of this process 
has been the development of new industrial relations institutions and labor 
laws. Consistent with the more general policy orientation toward market 
liberalization, labor law reforms were aimed at creating a functioning labor 
market and enabling individual enterprises to determine a broad range of 
*Peter Cahan is Professor of Management at The University of Melbourne, Australia, and Affiliate 
Professor at the ESC Rennes School of Business, France. Marco Michelotti is Associate Professor of Man­
agement and Organization Studies at the ESC Rennes School of Business, France. Cuy Standing is Profes­
sor of Economic Security at the University of Bath, United Kingdom. 
The authors are grateful to Fang Lee Cooke, Sean Cooney, Youqing Fan, Bill Harley, and Leisa Ser­
geant for detailed comments on earlier drafts, and are particularly grateful to Youqing Fan for providing 
detailed background to the labor law reforms summarized in Table I. We also thank Luke Peel who 
provided outstanding research assistance. Earlier versions of the paper were presented to seminars at 
various institutions and we thank the many seminar participants who provided helpful comments on the 
paper. The authors would like to acknowledge the Department of Management at Monash Universit)' 
who provided the initial grant to undertake this research. 
Data files and programs used to produce the estimates reported in this article are available from Cuy 
Standing at guystanding@standingnet.com. 
ILRReview, 65(3), July 2012. © by Cornell Universit)'. 
Print 0019-7939/Online 2162-271X/00/6501 §05.00 
652 ILRRE\aEW 
issues at the workplace level, including recruitment and dismissal, wages 
and other forms of remuneration, and investments in training. These re­
forms have not only modified the structure and dynamics of China's econ­
omy but also profoundly altered the approach of many enterprises to 
managing labor. This is particularly the case in SOEs in which Western man­
agement HR practices have been gradually introduced. 
To what extent have these economic reforms provided the catalyst for the 
development of more sophisticated approaches to labor management in 
China, particularly the diffusion of Western-style human resource (HR) 
practices? To what extent has the use of these practices improved key estab­
lishment outcomes such as productivity, labor costs, and efficiency? Alterna­
tively, to what extent have the intended effects of such practices faced 
barriers in implementation due to cultural and regulatory constraints? In 
this article we use data collected from a large sample of Chinese establish­
ments in 2001 to assess (1) the varying take-up of specific HR practices; and 
(2) whether the deployment of these HR practices had a significant impact 
on three key measures of establishment performance: productivity, labor 
costs, and unit labor costs. 
There is now a significant body of work that provides support for the hy­
pothesis that HR practices can have a significant effect on performance. 
This work spans a number of industry and national contexts; however, few 
studies have assessed the extent to which Western-style HR practices have 
been adopted in Chinese establishments and the strength of the relation­
ship between such practices and establishment outcomes. Given the enor­
mous economic reforms that have transformed China's economy over the 
last 30 years, a unique environment exists in which to assess these questions. 
Such questions are particularly salient because researchers have faced sev­
eral challenges in collecting establishment-level data in China that is of high 
quality and scope. 
In this article we use an exceptional data set that allows us to investigate 
in a more robust manner tbe extent to which Western-style HR practices 
have been adopted in Chinese workplaces and their effect on a number of 
establishment outcomes. This is important because the transfer of Western 
HR practices in China has been generally documented in an anecdotal 
manner only, and the implications for organizational outcomes have not 
been well established. Significantly, our data enable us to assess whether the 
adoption of a range of HR practices has a significant effect on establishment 
performance (measured as value of sales per employee), labor costs (wage 
and nonwage labor costs), and unit labor costs. 
China's Economic Reforms 
The transition to a market economy in China has now extended over more 
than 30 years. This process has been widely documented by a number of 
scholars researching China's economic transition (e.g., Qian 2003; Wu 
2005; Naughton 2007). It has consisted of successive waves of reforms and. 
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in contrast to the shock therapy administered to the command economies 
of Eastern Europe, the Chinese approach to transition has been a gradualist 
one (Child and Tse 2001). 
The transition process has typically been characterized as consisting of 
two distinct phases (Naughton 2007). In the first phase, Chinese policymak­
ers established a dual-track economic system, which allowed for an increas­
ing level of market activity alongside the planned economy (Lin, Cai, and Li 
1998; Lau, Qian, and Roland 2000) .While this phase enabled a growth in 
competition in product markets through the formation of town and village 
enterprises (TVEs), domestic private enterprises (POEs), jo in t venture en­
terprises (JVEs) with foreign multinationals, and wholly foreign-owned en­
terprises (FOEs), the activities of SOEs remained virtually untouched, and 
the development of competitive labor markets was weak. From the early 
1990s, a new wave of reforms was introduced. These reforms were in tended 
to integrate the two systems (or tracks) through the strengthening of mar­
ket institutions, particularly in the area of labor and capital markets, and by 
exposing SOEs to greater market competit ion through restructuring, priva­
tization, and corporate governance reforms (Qian 2003). 
As a consequence of these reforms, China has experienced a transforma­
tion in the institutional, technological, and organizational foundations of 
industry (Naughton 2007). New industries have been created, and existing 
ones have undergone major structural reform. These developments have, in 
turn, been associated with substantial reforms of institutions governing in­
dustrial relations and labor management at the workplace level (Frenkel and 
Kuruvilla 2002; Shen 2007). Before discussing these developments, a num­
ber of salient dimensions of the transition process need to be described. 
Diversification of Ownership: FDI, SOE Reforms, 
and the Expanding Private Sector 
A striking feature of the transition process has been the role of FDI and the 
growing diversity in corporate ownership. The value of FDI into China has 
grown from an average annual rate of less than 1% of CDP during the 1980s, 
rising sharply to 6% of GDP in 1994, and falling to around 3% per year 
since 2005 (Cole, Elliot, andjing 2009). FDI has provided an important 
catalyst for China's rapid expansion during this period, as well as promoting 
the diffusion of technological and organizational innovations, and manage­
ment capabilities (Naughton 2007). Since 1979, China has experienced an 
average annual real growth rate of around 9.5%, representing a sevenfold 
increase in GDP per capita over that period (Hoffman, Zhao, and Ishihara 
2007).! 
'The reliabilit)' of official data on CDP and other aggregate statistics have been widely questioned; see 
Naughton (2007) for a review. Naughton, for example, suggests that a large part of the explanation for 
China's rates of growth during this period is the significant underestimation of output during the early 
reform period. In a detailed assessment of productivity growth over the period 1978 to 1998, Young 
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Commencing with the Open Door Policy of 1978, restrictions on EDI in 
Chinese industry were gradually removed. These reforms initially began 
with the creation of a number of special economic zones (SEZs) designed to 
attract foreign capital. Over the course of the 1980s, the number of SEZs 
was expanded and provided the platform for foreign investment in the form 
of joint venture enterprises and, then, from the 1990s, wholly owned for­
eign enterprises. By 2003 there were more than 100 SEZs across China 
(Jinglian 2005) .The form that EDI took has also evolved significantly over 
this period. During the 1980s, various forms of joint ventures between a 
multinational firm and a domestic Chinese partner represented the typical 
ownership standard for which foreign investments were made. Since the 
late 1990s, however, these have been overtaken by foreign investment in the 
form of wholly owned foreign subsidiaries. By 2005, the latter accounted for 
around two-thirds of all EDIflows into China (Naughton 2007). 
The growing importance of EDI to China's economic capacity was paral­
leled by reforms to SOEs. These reforms reflected the two phases of transi­
tion described above. In the first phase, SOEs were largely protected from 
external product market competition and remained a central part of Chi­
nese industry. There were, nonetheless, a number of important reforms 
implemented during this phase to improve efficiency, including (1) the en­
hancement of the authority of enterprise managers to make resource alloca­
tion and production decisions; (2) the provision of incentive funds and 
profit retention schemes to fund enterprise investments, worker welfare 
provisions, and the payment of bonuses to production workers; and (3) the 
introduction of incentive mechanisms designed to reward SOE managers 
for improved performance (Croves et al. 1995). During the second phase of 
transition inidated in the mid-1990s, the external protections given to SOEs 
were removed and corporate law changes, aimed at facilitating corporatiza­
tion and privatization of SOEs, resulted in a sharp decline in the number of 
SOEs and their employment levels (Megginson and Netter 2001). By 2005, 
most loss-making SOEs had been closed or sold off, while the most profit­
able ones had been corporatized or privatized {zhuadafangxiao). 
The developments described so far contributed to a rapid diversification 
in ownership of Chinese-based enterprises, as summarized in Eigure 1. This 
figure reports the number of workers employed by different types of enter­
prises and shows a dramatic shift in employment away from the state sector 
to private firms. In 1978, almost 75 million employees were working in SOEs, 
representing approximately 78% of China's urban workforce (or around 
20% of the 401.5 million workers employed across different types of firms in 
both urban and rural areas). By 2009, however, employment in SOEs had 
fallen to just over 64 million employees, which represented less than 20% 
of all urban employment (or around 8.2% of China's 780 million strong 
(2003) finds that once adjustments are made for rising labor force participation, the shift of labor from 
agriculture and improvements in educational attainment, labor and total factor productivity growth in 
the non-agricultural economy rose 2.6% and 1.4% annually. 
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Figure I. Employment by Enterprise Type, 1978-2009 
25 n 
Year 
-SOES COEs TVEs POEs SelfEmp 
-JVEs/FOEs 
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, various years, 1980-2009. 
Notes: COE: collectively owned enterprises; FO/JVEs: foreign-owned andjoint venture enterprises; POEs: 
domestic privately owned enterprises; SOEs: state-owned enterprises; and TVEs: township- and xillage­
owned enterprises. 
workforce). By contrast, the number of workers classified as self-employed 
rose from a miniscule 150,000 workers to represent a similar proportion of 
the workforce (65.9 million workers, or 8.4% of all workers) over the same 
period. Employment also grew dramatically in TVEs and POEs. Between 
1978 and 2009, the proportion of the workforce employed in TVEs had in­
creased almost threefold, rising from 7.1% of the workforce to just fewer 
than 20%. In 1978, no private sector firms existed; however, by 2009, this 
group of firms employed almost 120 million workers (or 15.4% of total em­
ployment) . 
Industrial Relations and HR in China 
Industrial Relations and Labor Management Practices 
under the Planned Economy 
Under a planned economy, China did not have a competitive labor market 
(Naughton 2007). Employment decisions and personnel management {ren­
shi guanli) within SOEs and COEs were subject to centralized control, ad­
ministered through detailed and rigid policy guidelines promulgated by the 
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Ministries of Labor and Personnel (Cooke 2005). Consequendy, labor man­
agement practices were relatively uniform, irrespective of industry, work­
place size, or occupation. The state determined employment and wage 
levels and how workers were recruited. The state also imposed detailed and 
restrictive personnel guidelines on the management of workers and labor 
issues, including a system of seniority for promotion and a narrow wage 
structure across occupations. These guidelines imposed common standards 
and gave management little capacity to tailor labor management practices 
to meet workplace needs. 
For most workers, SOE work units {danwei) played a central role in their 
lives, providing them with a job for life, a range of welfare entitlements in­
cluding subsidized housing, education, and healthcare and a retirement 
pension (Dong and Xu 2008). Labor management practices were modeled 
on the "three irons" {jiu santie): the iron rice bowl, the iron chair, and iron 
wages (Helburn and Shearer 1984), which provided for centrally planned 
job allocations, a strongly egalitarian and seniority-based pay structure, and 
a range of cradle-to-grave welfare and health entidements provided through 
the enterprise (Zhang etal. 2008). 
The combination of highly centralized employment and wage regulation 
was associated with an extremely inflexible system of labor management, 
overstaffing, and inefficient resource allocation, with many SOEs reporting 
stagnant or negative productivity growth over extended periods of time 
(Huang and Duncan 1997). Naughton (2007), for example, reports that by 
1978, quits and dismissals had become virtually nonexistent. A Chinese urban 
worker was ten times more likely to retire and four times more likely to die 
on the job than to quit or be dismissed. This inflexibility was reinforced by 
the regulation of labor mobility through the household registration system, 
which restricted employment to local areas of residence (Kuruvilla and 
Erickson2002). 
Reforms to Industrial Relations Institutions after 1978 
Reforms to labor market and industrial relations institutions introduced 
since the adoption of the Open Door Policy have been characterized as 
having three primary aims (Cooke 2005): (1) to create a competitive labor 
market; (2) to restructure work practices in SOEs; and (3), to allow, to a very 
limited extent, the establishment of workers' organizations. Table 1 summa­
rizes the major industrial relations regulatory reforms introduced since 
1978. As this table shows, the period before the 1990s was characterized by 
limited activity, v^ ith some attempts to build a degree of numerical flexibility 
into employment decisions of SOEs. In 1978 reforms were introduced to 
regulate the establishment of "grass-roots" union organization in joint ven­
tures and, in 1986, changes in the law allowed firms to hire new employees 
for fixed five-year periods, with no obligation on either the firm or the em­
ployee to renew the contract after that period (Frenkel and Kuruvilla 2002). 
Further changes provided SOEs the right to lay off surplus workers (Shen 
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Table 1. Major Labor Law Reforms in China, 1978-Present 
Year Law/Regulation 
1978 Regulations on the Administra­
tion of Employment in Sino-
Foreign Joint Ventures 
1986 Four Temporary Régulations 
1992 Trade Union Law 1992 
1993 Regulations on Settlement of 
Labor Disputes in Enterprises 
1994 Labor Law 
1994 Provisions on Collective Contracts 
2001 Trade Union Law 
2004 Regulations on Collective 
Contract 
2008 Labor Contract Law 
2008 Labor Dispute Mediation and 
Arbitration Law 
2008 Employment Promotion Law 
Key Reforms Introduced 
- Stipulated the status, obligations, and rights of unions in 
newly formed joint venture undertakings 
- Introduced the capacity for firms to hire workers on 
fixed-term contracts 
- Extended the scope for SOEs to lay off redundant 
workers 
- Formalizes the legal status rights and obligations of 
unions at the workplace level 
- Established a new framework for labor dispute resolu­
tion 
- The first major employment law in China for a market-
based system of labor allocation 
- Established uniform regulation for the formation of 
labor contracts 
- Specifies minimum labor standards and procedures for 
dispute resolution 
- Extended and reformed the 1992 Labor Law, notably 
the creation of collective contracts at the workplace level 
- Specified the primar)' functions and legal obligations of 
trade unions 
- Established legal protections of union officials and 
union properties 
- Prescribed more detailed rules regulating the role and 
of "grassroots" union organization in the workplace 
- Introduced regulations for conducting collective negoti­
ations and the signing of collective contracts 
- Introduced new regulations covering: 
- the termination of employment contracts 
- employment protection for part-time and seconded 
workers

- open-ended labor contracts

-	 the right of employees to end labor contracts and

receive severance rights

- New provisions aimed to make arbitration procedures 
more accessible for workers 
- Established emplo)'ment growth as a key economic 
development goal 
- Regulated the formation of employment agencies, voca­
tional training, and placement assistance 
- Expanded prohibitions on workplace discrimination 
2007). Nonetheless, it has been generally acknowledged that SOEs re­
mained largely protected from the reform process during this period (see, 
for example, Dong and Putterman 2003). 
Beginning with the adoption of a policy aimed at developing a socialist 
market economy in 1992, a progression of further labor law changes pro­
vided SOEs (and private sector enterprises) with greater autonomy over em­
ployment and wage-setting decisions, and removed obligations to provide 
welfare entidements (Cooney 2007). These reforms involved a gradual ex­
tension of the employment contract system, as well as the extension of the 
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rights of union representatives in the workplace and their involvement in 
the negotiation of collective agreements (Gallagher 2005).^ 
In SOEs, this phase involved what were known as the Three Systems re­
forms (Cooke 2005), which included the replacement of lifetime employ­
ment arrangements with fixed-term contracts, the replacement of seniority 
with greater scope for the introduction of performance-based pay, and the 
privatization of enterprise-level social welfare arrangements with new wel­
fare schemes in which workers were required to contribute to pension and 
other welfare insurance funds (maternity, unemployment, accident and 
medical) (Naughton 2007). After 1997, the restructuring of SOEs resulted 
in large-scale workforce reductions (Appleton et al. 2002). Taylor and Li 
(2007), for example, estimate that between 1998 and 2005, SOEs dismissed 
approximately 60%of their workforce, or around 30 million employees. 
The Diffusion of HR Practices in China 
These new market and institutional realities faced by corporatized or priva­
tized SOEs were also reflected in innovation and evolution in the type of 
labor management practices utilized by other types of work organizations. 
Early research examining the types of HR practices deployed in the first 
generation of JVE arrangements indicated that foreign firms typically 
adapted to local HR practices (e.g., Helburn and Shearer 1984); subsequent 
studies indicate a gradual shift toward the diffusion of foreign HR practices, 
including the introduction of formal recruitment procedures, performance-
related pay, and performance management systems (Björkman 2002). 
These trends have to varying degrees been found in both domestic firms 
and foreign firms. Frenkel and Kuruvilla (2002), for example, observed that 
during the 1990s inefficient SOEs were typically forced to adopt a cost mini­
mization and productivity improvement strategy. This has involved the adop­
tion of low-skilled and low-pay employment arrangements and a reliance on 
numerical and wage flexibility to remain profitable. Foreign-invested firms 
have more typically adopted an HR approach based on foreign (home coun­
try) practices, but often with a blend of processes adapted from traditional 
Chinese employment arrangements that leads to a hybrid approach in 
which functional flexibility, quality, and training are given a priority role 
(Ding and Warner 1999; Björkman et al. 2008). For example, in a study of 
97 foreign firms operating joint ventures in China during the mid-1990s. Lu 
and Björkman (1997) reported that most had introduced both performance 
management systems and performance-related pay systems based on home 
^Although union rights to play a more pro-active role in the workplace have been extended consider­
ably since 1992, their ambiguous role as both a party organization and a worker representative remains 
a major constraint on their capacity to act independently. These constraints are reinforced by the illegal 
status of strikes and other forms of industrial action (Cooney 2007). Strikes and protestó are more typi­
cally initiated by unrecognized groups or more spontaneous actions (Lee 2007). There has, over the last 
few years, been an increasing tolerance for industrial action, and rank-and-file control over grassroots 
union activities in a growng number of instances. 
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country practices, but had substantially adapted them to the local environ­
ment. These involved adaptations such as the retention of some elements of 
seniority in promotion systems, narrow wage differentials, and relatively 
common performance pay increments across groups of workers. 
Overall, the limited evidence indicates a somewhat uneven shift in labor 
management practices over the period of reform (Cooke 2005), which ap­
pears to reflect a number of factors: (1) the inconsistent and unbalanced 
manner in which regulatory changes have been interpreted and enforced in 
different provinces across China (Erenkel and Kuruvilla 2002); (2) the per­
sistence of traditional approaches in corporatized or privatized SOEs 
(Taylor 2002); (3) a lack of understanding in POEs of the needs and conse­
quences of adopting a more comprehensive approach to managing labor 
(Cooke 2005); and (4) potential incompatibilities between some HR prac­
tices (such as performance-based pay and large wage differentials) and cul­
tural values (Yalabik et al. 2008). 
Nonetheless, a growing body of evidence indicates that an increasing 
number of Chinese firms are developing the HR function and implement­
ing more sophisticated HR strategies, although distinct differences in the 
use of HR practices persist between SOEs and domestic and foreign-owned 
private firms (Cooke 2009). In SOEs in particular, remnants of the person­
nel management practices associated with the planned economy survive: 
many older workers retain rights of lifetime employment, health care, and 
enterprise-provided pensions. In the same workplace, younger workers are 
more typically employed on fixed-term contracts and contribute to public 
social insurance schemes (Warner 2008). 
HR Practices and Organizational Outcomes in the Chinese Context 
The gradual and uneven take-up of HR practices in China is hardly surpris­
ing and reflects a broad range of factors. As the preceding discussion sug­
gests, the shift toward a more sophisticated approach to HR has in large 
part been dictated by the graduated nature of institutional reforms over the 
last three decades. By the beginning of this century, many of the restrictions 
placed on both domestic and foreign firms use and implementation of vari­
ous HR practices had been removed (Naughton 2007). 
Nonetheless, a number of scholars have sought to highlight factors that 
are likely to constrain whether particular HR practices are deployed 
(Björkman et al. 2008). This literature suggests that a significant relation­
ship between HR practices and performance may not be evident in the 
China context for two distinct reasons. Eirst, transition economies such as 
China present an institutional environment that is significantly different 
from that found in established market economies (Peng and Heath 1996). 
Such an environment often generates a high level of institutional uncer­
tainty, which is in turn likely to influence the effectiveness of any business 
strategies firms may seek to deploy, including returns on investments in HR 
capabilities (Law, Tse, and Zhau 2003). These differences have implications 
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for domesticfirms—SOEs and private sector enterprises—as well as foreign 
firms (Child and Tse 2001). For SOEs or former SOEs, governments may 
continue to limit their discretion to allocate resources efficientiy. They may 
also be relatively slow to acquire adequate management capability to oper­
ate in a market-based environment (Wang, Bruning, and Peng 2007). For 
foreign firms not subject to these constraints, transitional institutions may 
nonetheless inhibit their ability to effectively manage their operations. An 
aspect of particular concern is the high degree of discretion provided to 
local officials in the interpretation and application of rules designed to 
facilitate economic reforms. Such discretion has been associated with cor­
ruption, appropriation, and other forms of elite opportunism as well as dis­
crimination against private sector firms (Law et al. 2003; Naughton 2007). 
Moreover, where reforms have introduced more market-oriented institu­
tions, pre-existing political systems may, intentionally or otherwise, continue 
to exert an ongoing influence on regulatory institutions (Child and Tse 
2001; Li etal. 2008). 
Second, a number of researchers have highlighted the potential role of 
the normative institutional or cultural factors in constraining whether West­
ern management practices can be effectively transferred to Asian countries 
(Bae and Lawler 2000; Björkman and Lu 2001; Yalabik et al. 2008). Cooke 
(2005: 116) has observed that HR policies in FOEs and JVEs are "not neces­
sarily embraced by the employees with enthusiasm." This has been observed 
across a number of studies (e.g., Easterby-Smith, Malina, and Lu 1995; Huo 
and Von Glinow 1995; Evans, Pucik, and Barsoux 2002). In the Chinese con­
text, particularism in social and business relationships, evident in the role 
that established networks {guanxi) and status play, may mitigate the effec­
tiveness of practices based on employee involvement. Similarly, the available 
evidence suggests that Chinese workers adhere to a strong egalitarian ethic 
and have not generally accepted significant wage differentials as a form of 
incentive (Taylor 2002). Although the use of bonuses and incentive-based 
pay are widespread, notably after reforms introduced in the mid-1990s, 
these types of bonuses have been found to be distributed across employees, 
regardless of their performance (Taylor 2002). 
Cross-cultural research on management practices also provides strong 
support for the hypothesis that "members of high power-distance societies 
believe that subordinates should play the role of taking instructions and or­
ders from their supervisors" (Hui, Au, and Fock 2004: 47).Consequently, 
managers operating in these cultural contexts will be less willing to delegate 
decisions, and employees less willing to exercise discretionary behaviors. A 
number of studies have found that Chinese employees are more dependent 
on supervisors and show a higher acceptance of power differences than do 
employees in Western countries (Giacobbe-Miller et al. 2003; Hui et al. 
2004). 
These culturalist arguments have, however, been criticized as being overly 
static in the way culture is conceptualized (Fang 2006) and as providing a 
weak basis for understanding changing management practices over time 
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(Edwards and Kuruvilla 2005). The extent of economic reforms in the Asian 
context may generally be associated with shifting cultural norms, which are 
in turn linked to a more ready acceptance of HR practices (Bae et al. 2003). 
Such reforms are likely to be evident in the Chinese context in particular as 
industry has modernized and internalized Western management influences 
(Frenkel and Kuruvilla 2002). Ralston et al. (2006) found that work values 
held by mainland Chinese managers had, over the last 20-year period, 
tended to converge with the values of managers from H o n g Kong and the 
United States. 
Despite these perplexities, a number of studies have begun to investigate 
the effects that HR practices may have on organizational performance in 
the Chinese context (Law et al. 2003; Sun, Axyee, and Law 2007; Akhtar, 
Ding, and Ce 2008; Ngo, Lau, and Foley 2008).^ A diverse range of mea­
sures are used in these studies, both in terms of measuring performance 
outcomes (employee turnover, productivity, perceived profitability, and re­
turn on equity), and the types of HR practices that are expected to influ­
ence these outcomes. 
In one o f the earliest of these studies. Law et al. (2003) examine the rela­
tionship between the extent to which top management perceive the organi­
zation's HR approach to be strategic and the firm's performance. Although 
this study also includes a measure of employees' attitudes toward manage­
ment , unfortunately, it did not provide any information about variation in 
HR practices or their consequences for organizational performance. Using 
a single item measure drawn from Devanna et al.'s (1982) HR index, Ngo et 
al. (2008) report a study of the effect of HR practices on firm performance 
in 600 Chinese firms. They find that HR practices have a significant effect 
on an organization's performance, which was moderated by the employee 
relations climate. The reliability of their findings is also qualified by their 
use of subjective measures of financial performance. Similarly, while Aktar 
et al. (2008) use a well-established instrument to measure HR strategy, their 
reliance on a measure of performance based on managerial perceptions 
raises questions about the validity of their findings. Finally, in a piece of re­
search investigating the HR-performance nexus. Sun et al. (2007) exam­
ined the relationship between high performance work systems (HPWS), 
organizational citizenship behaviors, and organizational performance (vol­
untary turnover and sales per employee) in a small sample (n = 81) of Chi­
nese hotels located in a single province. Notwithstanding the high quality of 
the data collected, the authors recognize a number of limitations, including 
the small sample size, the single industry, and single geographic focus of the 
study, which in turn suggests the need for further research. Note, however. 
'A body of work published in Chinese e.xamines different aspects ofthe HR-performance relationship 
(Zhao 2001; Fan and Björkman 2003; Lui, Zhuo, and Chao 2005; Su, Zeng, and Wright 2007; Qiao, 
Wang, and Luan 2008). These studies have typically found no relationship or weak relationships between 
HR practices and performance. Su et al. (2007) have attributed this in large part to methodological 
weaknesses of many ofthe sttidies so far tmdertaken in the Chinese context. 
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that none of these studies examine the impact of HR practices on labor 
costs or unit labor costs. 
In short, after more than 30 years of economic and industrial relations 
reforms in China, we believe there is a need to examine the extent to which 
Western-style HR practices have been adopted in this country and their ef­
fects on organizational outcomes. Moreover, China represents a unique ex­
ample of a transition economy in that the pace and type of institutional, 
economic, and social reforms in this country have been significantly differ­
ent from other experiences, typically in Central and Eastern Europe. This 
need is further reinforced by the fact that available empirical research ex­
amining the link between HR practices and organizational outcomes is un­
satisfactory in terms of either sample size or the measures adopted. 
Empirical Approach 
We report on an analysis of survey data on the adoption of HR practices in a 
large sample of Chinese establishments and, using a standard production 
function framework deployed in the HR-performance literature, we seek to 
assess the impact of HR practices on a number of establishment outcomes 
in the Chinese context. To do so, we derive measures capturing whether an 
establishment uses a broad range of HR practices covering non-managerial 
employees, including training, employment security, nonwage benefits, pay 
systems, employee involvement, recruitment, and grievance procedures and 
then assess their impact on sales per employee, a commonly used proxy for 
organizational performance. Unlike most studies, however, we extend the 
empirical analysis to examine the effects of HR practices on two other orga­
nizational outcomes: labor costs and unit labor costs. Even though these 
outcomes are critical to understanding the true value of HR practices, they 
are rarely examined simultaneously alongside performance effects—see 
Cappelli and Neumark (2001) and Way (2002) for exceptions to this obser­
vation. 
Data Description 
Data used in this study were obtained from an unpublished survey adminis­
tered in China by the International Labor Office in 2000 to 2001 as part of 
its cross-national Enterprise Labor Elexibility and Security (ELES) survey 
program. The ILO has conducted a number of ELES surveys in developing 
and transition economies in Asia, the Americas, and Eastern Europe. The 
ELES surveys consist of a core questionnaire design, which is then adapted 
to the survey environments in each country. As a result, individual measures 
based on established labor market and HR-related surveys undertaken in 
industrialized countries have been adjusted to local conditions so they could 
be easily understood and answered by respondents (Standing 2003). In 
some instances, items were introduced to capture country-specific labor 
management practices. Eor example, in transition economies such as China, 
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measures relating to the importance of enterprise-based social welfare ben­
efits, the percentage of employees laid off, and non-producdon sources of 
income were included. 
A sample of 1,024 establishments was selected using a random start with 
thé probability of being selected based on population proportions accord­
ing to employment size and sector. The respondent establishments were 
evenly (approximately) distributed over the 3 regions included in the sur­
vey (Hangzhou, Zengzhou, and Lanzhou) .'^ Table 2 summarizes the charac­
teristics of establishments included in the final sample used in the study. 
The ELFS survey questionnaires more closely resemble an official census 
than an academic survey, both in terms of the types of questions asked and 
in the sense that participation of selected firms was compulsory (Buck et al. 
2003). The China ELFS survey consisted of two parts, administered at differ­
ent points in time in 2000 and 2001. Both parts were administered by the 
Academy of Labor and Social Security in the Chinese Ministry of Labor and 
Social Security. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with senior manag­
ers, usually accompanied by ILO staff. The first part of the survey was com­
pleted by a financial representative (a firm accountant or financial officer) 
and contained questions relating to establishment characteristics, the estab­
lishment's revenue and cost structure, resource allocation, the number and 
characteristics of employees, wages, and other nonwage labor costs. The 
second part, which was administered to HR and operational managers, con­
sisted of questions that asked about a broad range of employment arrange­
ments, labor management practices, and employee outcomes. 
Interviewers and supervisors of the fieldwork were trained using a com­
mon training manual. Training sessions detailed basic concepts underlying 
survey questions, items and questions used in the survey, and appropriate 
interview techniques. This process also led to some rewording of the ques­
tionnaire to remove potential misunderstanding of terms. Data reliability 
was enhanced as two or more visits were often undertaken to firms and, in 
addition, random field checks were made to monitor the interviewers' ac­
curacy. The design for data collection also had a number of significant fea­
tures. First, the survey instrument relies on objective data, with no attempt 
to collect information about management or employee attitudes. Second, 
the use of multiple informants minimizes the likelihood that the method of 
data collection is likely to contribute to correlation between variables (com­
mon method variance), thereby producing an overestimation of the likely 
effects of HR practices on establishment performance. Third, the use of key 
informants with appropriate knowledge of the information to be collected 
provides a greater level of confidence in the quality of the information 
••Hangzhou is the capital of the southern province of Zhejiang. Traditionally a center of textile and 
heavy machine manufacturing, it has developed into a center of electronics and other forms of manufac­
turing. Zengzhou is the capital of the northern province of Henan and is an area of textile and heavy 
manufacturing. Lanzhou is the proxdncial capital of Cansu in northwestern China and has emerged as a 
center of energy production, manufacturing, and resources. 
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Table 2. Sample Characteristics (n= 1,024) 
Establishment Characteristic 
Workplace size 
1-49

50-99

100-499

500+

Ownership type 
SOE 
COE 
Private 
Foreign (EOE/JVE) 
Location 
Hangzhou 
Zengzhou 
Lanzhou 
Establishment age 
Less than 5 years 
5 but less than 10 years 
10 or more years old 
Don't know 
Industry 
Mining

Metals*

Machiner)', engineering*

Computers, electronics

Eood processing*

Chemicals*

Pharmaceuticals

Printing, paper, wood*

Eu rn i tu re

Textile, clothing*

Construction*

Other, manufacturing*

Electricity, gas, water

Transport, storage, communication*

Wholesale, retail trade*

Einance

Real estate*

Hotel, restaurant, travel*

Health and social work

Repair

Services, general

Education

Other, generic

Total 
Number of 
establishments 
291

167

308

151

275

208

373

129

331

226

360

240

221

552

11

10

30

163

19

91

89

12

36

8

63

64

35

6

43

106

8

31

57

5

7

20

6

8

917

Percentage (%) 
31.7 
18.2 
33.6 
16.5 
26.9 
20.3 
36.4 
12.6 
36.1 
24.6 
39.3 
23.4 
21.6 
53.9 
1.1 
1.1 
3.3 
17.8 
2.1 
9.9 
9.7 
1.3 
3.9 
0.9 
6.9 
7.0 
3.8 
0.7 
4.7 
11.6 
0.9 
3.4 
6.2 
0.5 
0.8 
2.2 
0.7 
0.9 
100.0 
* indicates industry categories for which dummy variables were constructed as 
controls in our estimations. 
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collected. Overall, then, the survey process allowed for the collection of de­
tailed information in a more reliable way than what is often associated with 
surveys using key informants. 
Variables 
A review of prior literature suggests that a number of HR practices are typi­
cally viewed as core to the functioning of an HR system and are likely to in­
fluence establishment outcomes. While a diverse range of HR practices have 
been included in previous studies examining the HR-performance rela­
tionship, most of this research included HR practices that empower non­
managerial employees by providing greater opportunities to participate in 
decision-making. For such opportunities of involvement to be effective, HR 
systems also require the adoption of practices that enhance employee skills 
and provide adequate motivation for employees to participate and utilize 
such skills in ways that improve productive efficiency. Opportunities for in­
volvement may be provided through a great variety of mechanisms, includ­
ing work teams, total quality management (TQM), and other consultative 
practices. 
The ELFS survey allows us to examine a range of key features of HR sys­
tems, including training arrangements, aspects of internal employment 
systems, nonwage benefits, incentive-based pay systems, forms of labor-
management cooperation and other employee voice mechanisms, recruit­
ment, andfinally, dispute settiement arrangements. 
Organizational Outcomes 
In this study we included an assessment of HR practices on three organiza­
tional outcomes: sales per employee, labor costs, and unit labor costs. Sales 
per Employee (in 2001) provides a proxy for organizational productivity. This 
has been a commonly used measure in several studies across cognate disci­
plines such as strategic management, the economics of organization, fi­
nance and accounting,^ as well as studies seeking to estimate the relationship 
between HR practices and organizational performance. Sun et al. (2007: 
567) suggest that this is an appropriate measure of organizational perfor­
mance because "it provides a single index that can be used to compare 
a firm's productivity as well as to estimate the dollar value of returns for 
investments in employees through high-performance human resource prac­
tices. This measure of productivity reflects employee efforts that are some­
what insulated from variations in the capital and product markets."^ 
•''See Richard et al. (2009) for a recent review of the organizational performance literature. 
''Cappelli and Neumark (2001) have also argued that financial measures, such as profitabilit)', may not 
be the most appropriate measures to assess performance in multi-establishment firms becausefirms may 
use different methods for calculating internal measures of plant-level performance, particularly where 
some production costs may be borne by the firm rather than the establishment. 
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We are aware that this measure can be problematic, particularly when 
used in a transition context. In particular, sales per employee can overstate 
the productivity effect for two main reasons. First, firms may produce more 
than what is optimal to reduce stock and to sell at a lower margin. This is a 
particularly sensitive issue in SOEs because managers are under both mar­
ket and political pressures to perform. Second, the number of employees 
tends to be higher than what is officially declared, as the informal sector is 
growing in China, particularly in private enterprises, and employers seek to 
avoid legal constraints and to avoid paying social security contributions. De­
spite these limitations, we believe that sales per employee can still provide 
very useful information in the Chinese context as firms were encouraged by 
the Ministry of Labor to be as transparent as possible in reporting their re­
sponses. In the ELFS survey, each establishment was asked to disclose the 
total value in Chinese Renminbi (RMB) of sales in 1999 and 2000. The 
mean of these two responses was then divided by the total number of regu­
lar employees at each establishment to provide an estimate of sales per em­
ployee. 
Labor Costs were captured using two measures: the logged value of the 
total wages costs per employee and the logged value of nonwage labor costs 
per employee. The ELFS survey included a question that asked respondents 
to indicate the total wage costs and nonwage costs for each of the previous 
two years. In each case the values for the two years were summed and the log 
of the mean value taken as our measure. Here, nonwage labor costs include 
allowances for workers, social security contributions, and payments in kind 
to employees and/or workers (meals, medical expenses, and transport al­
lowances) . 
Unit Labor Costs were estimated following Cappelli and Neumark (2001), 
which use the log of the ratio of sales per worker to labor costs per worker 
(or the log ofthe inverse of unit labor costs). 
Training 
Employer provided training is measured as the proportion of all employees 
at the workplace who had received training. Training included both formal 
and on-the-job training programs run by the establishment. The survey ac­
tually asked respondents to indicate the number of employees who received 
training in 1999 and 2000. In each case the response was divided by the 
number of employees and the estimate was computed as the average over 
these two years. 
Regular Workers 
Employment stability in the form of regular employment provides workers 
with incentives to invest in firm-specific skills and to encourage discretion­
ary effort (Wu and Chaturvedi 2009). The survey asked respondents to spec­
ify the number of employees belonging to the following work statuses: 
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regular full-time, regular part-time, temporary or casual, contract workers, 
trainees or apprent ices . To best capture the p ropor t ion of workers who en­
joyed stable employment , we calculated the p ropor t ion of the total work­
force that was employed as regular employees. 
Benefits 
The presence of various nonwage benefits schemes provides means to elicit 
greater commitment from employees to their organization (Haines, Jalette, 
and Larose 2010). This is particularly important in China, where a broad 
range of nonwage benefits were common, especially in SOEs. The survey 
asked respondents whether eight employee benefits were provided by the 
employer: paid leave, paid sick leave, holiday/recreation facilities, sickness 
benefits, subsidized housing, childcare, pension/retirement benefits, and 
subsidized transport services. Avalué of 0 was assigned for each benefit that 
was not available, and a value of 1 was coded if the benefit was provided by 
the employer. The scores for individual benefits were summed to obtain an 
overall score. 
Incentive-Based Pay 
Within the HR literature, incentive-based pay arrangements have generally 
been viewed as an important complement to both investments in employee 
skills and different forms of employee involvement. Studies have also found 
that variable pay schemes may contribute to performance by reducing labor 
turnover (Haines et al. 2010). The survey asked three questions, which we 
used to capture the use of incentive pay systems. The first question asked 
whether the establishment operated a profit-related pay system for employ­
ees (No = 0, Yes = 1 ). The second question asked whether the establishment 
operated any incentive scheme for individual employees, such as bonus 
schemes (No = 0, Yes = 1). The third question asked respondents to indicate 
whether the establishment had introduced any other income-related bene­
fit scheme, such as skilled-based pay (No = 0, Yes = 1). These three measures 
were first entered as individual items, and then in a separate regression as a 
composite variable, consisting of the sum of responses to these three items. 
Eabor-Management Cooperation 
Central to most studies examining the effects of HR practices on establish­
ment outcomes has been the extent to which employees are provided with 
opportunities for involvement in decision-making. Typically, researchers 
have been interested in the role of self-managed or autonomous work teams 
in eliciting discretionary effort and increased productivity. Unfortunately, 
our survey did not include any questions relating to work teams; however, 
the questionnaire did ask respondents whether participation-enhancing work 
practices were employed: quality circles, joint consultation arrangements to 
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discuss work and production related issues, and other. Responses to these 
three items were coded as dichotomous variables (No = 0, Yes = 1). Quality 
circle and joint consultation items were entered as individual items and 
then in a separate regression as a composite measure consisting of the sum 
of responses to the three items. 
Occupational Health and Safety Committee 
The survey asked respondents to indicate whether the establishment had a 
committee or department to maintain the safety of workers at the work­
place. Responses included: 1 = "Yes, a safety committee"; 2 = "Yes, a safety 
department"; 3 = 'Yes, both a safety committee and a safety department"; or 
4 = "No". These responses were re-coded to either Yes (= 1) or No (= 0) to 
generate a dichotomous variable. 
Recruitment 
Measures capturing various recruitment practices were also included in our 
study. The intention was to assess how such practices might influence the 
quality of employees. More robust recruitment practices are also expected 
to result in better quality matches between the firm and its employees and 
to reduce employee turnover. The survey asked respondents to indicate the 
main method used for recruiting production and shop floor workers. Re­
sponses were categorized as recruitment through advertising, direct recruit­
ment, recruitment through educational institutions, informal recruitment 
through relatives and friends, and other. Each category was coded as a di­
chotomous variable (No = 0, Yes =1). 
Probation 
The use of probationary periods may enhance performance for two reasons 
(Loh 1994). First, probation periods provide an employer with information 
that may not be available at the time of recruitment. Second, probation has 
also been found to discourage less-qualified workers from applying for jobs. 
The survey asked respondents to indicate whether the establishment usually 
hired new employees on a probationary basis (No = 0, Yes = 1). 
Formal Dispute Settlement Procedure 
The final HR practice we include is a measure of whether the establishment 
has a formal dispute resolution procedure. Such procedures are generally 
viewed as an important mechanism that allows dissatisfied employees to 
voice their grievance rather than exit. Properly functioning dispute mecha­
nisms are expected to improve employee perceptions of organizational jus­
tice (Haines et al. 2010). This in turn is viewed as a key means through 
which HR practices are likely to have positive performance effects (Wu and 
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Chaturvedi 2009). O u r survey asked the question: "How are labor disputes 
setüed in the establishment?" Respondents were asked to indicate whether 
disputes were setded through a voluntary dispute setflement procedure , 
through a Labor Dispute Court, or some other arrangement . Our interest 
was in unders tanding establishment-level HR practices. We therefore re-
coded responses to equal 1 if disputes were settled using an establishment-
level voluntary dispute settlement procedure , and to equal 0 for all o ther 
responses. 
Gontrol Variables 
A key concern among many researchers has been to identify potential biases 
introduced by missing variables (e.g., Bartel 2004), some of which reflect 
differences in industr)' environments (Datta, Cuthrie, and Wright 2005). To 
ensure these types of factors are accounted for, our analysis includes the fol­
lowing control variables: union presence (No = 0, Yes = 1), logged value of 
establishment age, dummy variables capturing different ownership types, 
and industry and regional dummy variables. Union presence is included to 
ensure any union effects are captured. While it is commonly believed that 
the dependency of Chinese unions on the state means they are unlikely to 
function independendy of management, recent evidence suggests they may 
nonetheless play an important role in influencing establishment level out­
comes (Ce 2007). The other controls are intended to capture differences 
such as industry dynamism, entrenched management styles and systems, 
and regional differences, which may also affect the potential returns on in­
vestments of HR practices. This is perhaps particularly significant in the 
context of transition economies in which regional differences in regulatory 
arrangements and enforcement may substantially impact on firm perfor­
mance (Child and Tse 2001; Law et al. 2003). In the case of industry dum­
mies, establishments were originally categorized in the survey as one of 23 
industry categories. As Table 2 indicates, the sample for some industry 
groups was extremely small, making it impossible to rely on these as sepa­
rate variables. When this was the case, these dummies were dropped from 
our estimation. Of the 23 industry categories identified in the survey, 12 
categories (indicated in Table 2) were used as control variables. Einally, 
dummy variables were created for each of the regions in which establish­
ments were located. 
Table 3 presents means, standard deviations, and correlations for all vari­
ables except the industry and region dummies. The correlations among 
variables were typically low, with a number of unsurprising exceptions. The 
capital inputs (r= .679, p < 0.01) and number of employees (r= .540, p < 
0.01) were strongly correlated with sales per employee. The log value of 
capital was also highly correlated with the log number of employees (r = 
.651, p < 0.01). Correlations among HR practice variables were generally low, 
indicating our results are unlikely to suff'er from multicoUinearity. Cenerally, 
HR practices were positively associated with establishment performance. 
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Table 3. Correlations among Variables 
Variables ; 2 3 4 5 
I. Ln Sales 1.00 
2. Ln Capital 0.68** 1.00 
3. Ln Employment 0.54** 0.65** 1.00 
4. Ln Establishment Age 0.18** 0.30** 0.37** 1.00 
5. Union presence 0.32** 0.33** 0.33** 0.38** 1.00 
6. POE 0.06 -0.14** -0.13** -0.37** -0.15** 
7. SOE 0.09** 0.28** 0.26** 0.36** 0.23** 
8. COE -0.25** -0.24** -0.13** 0.20** -0.01 
9. FOE/JVE 0.13** 0.14** 0.01 -0.19** -0.09** 
10. Training 0.00 -0.05 -0.13** -0.17** -0.27** 
11. Regular workforce -0.03 -0.03 -0.17** 0.04 0.02 
12. Benefits 0.46** 0.31** 0.28** 0.13** 0.30** 
13. Profit-based pay 0.21** 0.14** 0.17** 0.10** 0.15** 
14. Indi\'idual incentive 0.29** 0.10** 0.08* -0.11** 0.05 
15. New incentive 0.05 0.06* 0.05 -0.13** -0.04 
16. Quality circle 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.07* 
17. Joint consultative group 0.07 0.04 0.08* 0.03 0.09** 
18. OH&S committee 0.12** 0.18** 0.15** 0.07 0.08 
19. Recruit - advertise 0.09** 0.03 0.00 -0.16** -0.04 
20. Recruit-direct -0.07* -0.03 -0.03 -0.13** -0.15** 
21. Recruit-educational institution 0.27** 0.26** 0.26** 0.12** 0.14** 
22. Recruit - informal -0.10** -0.13** -0.10** -0.14** -0.14** 
23. Probation 0.28** 0.20** 0.14** -0.12** 0.01 
24. Formal dispute procedure 0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.01 
25. Ln Wage Costs 0.71** 0.68** 0.72** 0.30** 0.34** 
26. Ln Nonwage costs 0.08 0.05 -0.24** 0.06 0.08* 
27. Ln Unit Labor Costs 0.30** 0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.02 
Variables 15 16 17 18 19 
1. Ln Sales 
2. Ln Capital 
3. Ln Employment 
4. Ln Establishment Age 
5. Union presence 
6. POE 
7. SOE 
8. COE 
9. FOE/JVE 
10. Training 
11. Regular workforce 
12. Benefits 
13. Profit-based pay 
14. Individual incentive 
15. New incentive 1.00 
16. Quality circle 0.12** 1.00 
17. Joint consultative group 0.11** 0.41** 1.00 
18. OH&S committee 0.07 0.00 -0.01 1.00 
19. Recruit - advertise 0.12** 0.01 0.07* 0.07 1.00 
20. Recruit-direct 0.06 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.04 
21. Recruit-educational institution 0.09** 0.06* 0.03 0.08* 0.04 
22. Recruit-informal 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.19** 
23. Probation 0.15** 0.07* 0.01 0.06 0.17** 
24. Formal dispute procedure 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.07 0.01 
25. Ln Wage Costs 0.04 -0.03 0.06 0.13** 0.04 
26. Ln Nonwage costs -0.05 -0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 
27. Ln Unit Labor Costs 0.05 0.04 -0.05 0.05 0.03 
' Statistically significant at the .05 level; ** at the .01 level. 
671 HR PRACTICES IN CHINESE WORKPLACES 
Table 3. Continued 
10 11 12 13 14 
1.00 
-0.46** 1.00 
-0.38** -0.31** 1.00 
-0.29** -0.23** -0.19** 1.00 
0.11** -0.12** -0.09** 0.10** 1.00 
-0.02 0.01 0.05 -0.05 0.14* 1.00 
-0.05 0.14** -0.19** 0.20** -0.01 0.07 1.00 
-0.01 0.12** -0.04 -0.08** 0.05 -0.03 0.22** 1.00 
0.11** -0.07* -0.15** 0.12** 0.06 0.03 0.43** 0.23** 1.00 
0.06 -0.06* -0.06* 0.08** 0.14** -0.04 0.11** 0.08* 0.20** 
-0.02 -0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.08* 0.02 
0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.09* 0.13** 0.10** 0.05 
-0.19** 0.12** -0.01 0.09"^  -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.08* -0.03 
0.12** -0.14** -0.09** 0.14«* 0.09 -0.02** 0.06 0.02 0.15** 
0.10** -0.12** 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.06* 0.06 
-0.06 0.11** -0.13** 0.10** -0.06 -0.08 0.19** 0.16** 0.13** 
0.07* -0.12** 0.01 0.03 0.09 -0.07 -0.13** 0.01 0.03 
0.08** -0.05 -0.16** 0.15** 0.09 -0.03 0.26** 0.15** 0.31** 
0.05 -0.03 0.00 -0.05 0.02 -0.04 0.17** 0.07* 0.11** 
-0.08* 0.22** -0.23** 0.15** -0.09 -0.02 0.45** 0.15** 0.23** 
-0.04 -0.02 -0.04 0.07 0.02 0.30** 0.24** -0.06 0.16** 
0.04 -0.05 0.03 -0.03 0.07 -0.07 0.03 0.10** 0.02 
20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
1.00 
-0.14** 1.00 
-0.01 0.04 1.00 
0.10** 0.22** 0.08** LOO 
0.09** 0.05 0.00 0.11** 1.00 
-0.01 0.28** -0.13** 0.28** 0.05 1.00 
-0.07* 0.05 -0.05 0.07 -0.01 0.21** 1.00 
-0.02 0.04 0.06 -0.02 -0.03** -0.16** -0.29* 1.00 
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Table 4. Take-up of HR Practices by Firm Type (Percentage of Firms within Type)^ 
Eirm type 
HR Practice SOE POE FOE JVE Altfinns 
Proportion of workforce regular employees 
< 50 percent of total workforce 58.5 66.8 63.9 63.6 63.5 
50-74 percent 6.2 4.0 2.1 0.8 5.3 
75+ percent 35.3 29.2 35.3 35.7 31.3 
Proportion of workers in training 
Less than 20 percent of regular workforce 84.0 81.5 87.5 63.6 81.1 
20-49 percent 9.8 11.5 9.6 22.5 12.1 
50+ percent 6.2 7.0 2.9 14.0 6.8 
Benefits index'= 
No benefits provided 9.0 24.4 22.0 6.9 17.5 
1-2 benefits 11.4 15.8 26.8 5.2 15.9 
3-4 benefits 28.9 18.7 23.6 20.7 23.0 
5-6 benefits 38.0 22.0 22.0 34.5 28.0 
7-8 benefits 12.7 19.1 5.5 32.8 15.5 
Incentive pay 
Profit-based pay 61.5 50.9 47.6 41.1 51.9 
Individual incentives 46.9 59.5 37.5 68.2 52.5 
Other incentive schemes 17.5 24.9 16.8 31.0 21.9 
Labor-management cooperation 
Quality circles 2.5 3.2 4.8 4.7 3.6 
Joint consultation committee 4.4 6.7 5.8 6.2 5.8 
OH&S committee 53.4 30.9 42.3 56.2 42.8 
Recruitment 
Through advertisement 6.2 19.6 7.7 27.1 14.3 
Direct recniitment 33.8 50.7 43.8 48.1 44.2 
Through educational institution 30.5 19.8 12.0 34.1 23.0 
Informal recruitment 6.2 16.1 13.5 15.5 12.7 
Probation period used 66.5 75.1 55.3 88.4 70.3 
Formal Dispute Resolution Procedure 9.3 21.4 24.4 17.5 18.1 
•'The table reports the proportion of all firms (n= 1,024) within each type that has adopted each of the 
included HR practices. Percentages withñn groups may not add to 100.0 due to rounding. 
''SOE: State-owned enterprise; POE: Privately owned enterprise; FOE: Foreign-owned enterprise; JVE: 
Joint venture enterprise. 
•^ The benefits index was the sum of eight dummy variables that captured whether an establishment pro­
vided any of the following eight benefits: paid leave, paid sick leave, holiday/recreation facilities, sickness 
benefits, subsidized housing, childcare, pension/retirement benefits, and subsidized transport sendees. 
although the informal recruitment variable was negatively associated with 
sales per employee. 
Corporate Ownership and the Adoption of HR Practices 
We first present descriptive statistics on the adoption of different HR prac­
tices across types of firms. Table 4 reports the take-up of each of the HR 
practices described above. As this table shows, the adoption of different 
types of practices differed significandy across types of firms. Domestic POEs 
tended to employ a smaller proportion of their total workforce as regular 
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employees than did other types of firms. While the overwhelming majority 
of establishments reported that less than 20% of their workforce received 
training, a significantly higher than expected proportion of JVE firms—14% 
compared with 6.8% for the entire sample—reported that they provided 
training for more than half of their employees. The Benefits Index cap­
tured a range of entitlements typically associated with the social welfare 
functions of the danwei The enduring nature of these practices is evident 
particularly among SOEs, which reported significantly higher levels of pro­
vision of each of the eight benefits, as well as being more likely to provide a 
relatively higher number of these. This compares with a tendency among 
FOEs and domestic POEs to provide none or a small number of these ben­
efits. Interestingly, JVEs show a pattern of benefit provisions more closely 
related to SOEs than to private sector firms. 
There are also significant differences in the type of incentives provided to 
workers. Domestic firms—state-owned and privately owned firms—show a 
significantly higher propensity to utilize profit-based incentive schemes 
than do foreign firms or JVEs. Indeed FOEs show a significantly lower pro­
pensity to use any form of incentive pay arrangements compared with other 
types of firms. This difference is particularly evident in the proportion of 
FOEs utilizing individual forms of incentive pay (37.5% of firms, compared 
with 52.5% of all firms). 
Although few Chinese establishments reported having instituted quality 
circles (3.6% of all firms), a significantly higher proportion of FOEs (4.8%) 
and JVEs (4.7%) report this practice than either SOEs (2.5%) or domestic 
POEs (3.2%) .Joint consultative committees were more widely used, although 
our data suggest that by 2001, less than 10% of establishments had such ar­
rangements in place. Again, SOEs were far less likely to report consultative 
committees than did other types of firms. In contrast to either quality circles 
or joint consultative committees, a far larger proportion of establishments 
reported having an OH&S committee in place. Unlike the other forms of 
labor management consultation, OH&S committees were more prevalent in 
SOEs than other types of establishments. Privately owned and FOEs show a 
significantly lower propensity to institute OH&S committees than either 
SOEs or JVEs. 
Table 3 shows that the most widely used method of hiring is direct recruit­
ment; that is, directly hiring employees at the establishment door, without 
advertising or using an external agency. This practice was most common in 
POEs and JVEs, although a significantly higher proportion of POEs (19.6%) 
and JVEs (27.1%) also reported utilizing advertising as a way of attracting 
potential employees, compared with SOEs (6.2%) and FOEs (7.7%). Inter­
estingly, a similar pattern is evident in relation to the use of probation peri­
ods. Those firms who reported the use of advertising in recruitment were 
also significantly more likely to report using a probationary period as part of 
their recruitment decisions. 
Finally, a significantly higher proportion of private sector firms—both 
domestically and foreign-owned establishments—reported having a formal 
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dispute resolution process compared with either SOEs or JVEs. Again, this 
may reflect traditional systems within SOEs, which relied on management 
dominated "grass roots" (i.e., workplace) unions to manage grievances (Liu 
2010). 
HR Practices and Organizational Outcomes 
How have these practices influenced establishment outcomes in the Chi­
nese context? Our data enable us to assess whether these practices are asso­
ciated with three important indicators of firm performance: sales per 
employee, labor costs, and unit labor costs. Most studies have generally fo­
cused on examining the impact of HR practices on measures of productivity 
or financial performance, but few studies have attempted to assess the im­
pacts of these practices on labor costs and the cost of producing each unit of 
output. Moreover, Cappelli and Neumark suggest that these three variables 
"can be interpreted in terms of what matters most to different parties" 
(2001: 753). Employers have an obvious interest in productivity and unit 
labor costs as a measure of efficiency, while employees will (all else being 
equal) be better off where wage and nonwage expenditures are higher.' 
Sales per Employee 
Eollowing previous studies examining the HR-performance relationship 
(e.g.. Black and Lynch 2001; Bartel 2004), we base our empirical estimation 
on an augmented Cobb-Douglas production function containing the value 
of sales (F), labor (L), capital {K), and HR practice variables. A persistent 
problem identified in the research is the omission of relevant variables, 
thereby introducing biases in the estimate of the true relationship between 
HR practices and establishment performance (Cerhart et al. 2000). Using a 
more structured production function has the advantage of including base 
inputs of an establishment's production systems that have been excluded 
from many estimations of the relationship between HR practices and firm 
performance.^ 
'The strength of this ceteris paribus assumption has been questioned by some research. Black, Lynch, 
and Krivelyova (2004) show that the costs of implementing high performance work practices may be 
unevenly distributed across the workforce, through higher wage inequality and employment reductions. 
Similarly Codard (2001) shows that while alternative work practices have positive effects at a "moderate" 
level of adoption, such practices are also associated with negative employee outcomes when used more 
intensively. 
^ h  e production function used to estimate the effects of HPWS adopts a standard constant returns to 
scale function Q=aLí9O, where Qis some measure of output, K\s capital stock, and Z. is a measure of labor 
inputs. This form has been the one typically used in studies adopting a production function estimation 
framework. Black and Lynch (2001) test alternative specifications but find no significant differences in 
coefficients on capital and labor inputs or HR practices. In this framework, our measure of Z, is effectively 
augmented by introducing variables to capture the impact of HR practices in transforming a "raw" 
estimate of ¿into effective labor (Bartel 2004). Here we estimate the following regression:faY—a+ ß/nKj 
+ ylnL; + 5'HR^ + ri'CONTROLS + e¡, where ZraY¡ is the log of sales, ZnKj is the log of the value of capital. 
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Table 5. Effects of HR Practices on Sales per Employee (OLS Estimates^) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
beta t-statistic beta t-statistic beta t-statistic 
Control variables 
Union presence 0.105** 3.563 0.039 0.365 -0.033 -0.292 
Industry'' — — — — — 
Region"" 
— 
— — — — — 
Establishment characteristics 
Ln (Value of capital equipment) 0.458** 12.120 0.650** 4.822 0.619** 4.014 
Ln (No. of employees) 0.244** 6.615 0.386** 2.983 0.461** 3.112 
Log (Establishment age) 0.029 0.904 -0.127 -1.388 -0.143 -1.394 
Ownership 
State-owned -0.083** -2.492 -0.091 -0.850 -0.086 -0.692 
Collectively owned -0.032 -0.965 0.116 1.140 0.068 0.602 
Foreign-owned/joint venture -0.006 -0.198 -0.039 -0.439 -0.039 -0.360 
HR variables 
Training (proportion of total 0.181* 1.909 0.275* 2.087 
workforce) 
Regular workers (proportion of -0.079 -0.933 -0.030 -0.298 
total workforce) 
Benefits 0.045 0.436 0.060 0.447 
Incentive-based pay 0.056 0.651 
Profit-based pay 0.008 0.093 
Individual incentives • 0.087 0.642 
Other incentive scheme -0.034 -0.369 
Labor-management cooperation -0.023 -0.299 
Quality circles 0.010 0.099 
Joint consultation committee 0.012 0.129 
OH&S committee 0.050 0.621 0.076 0.839 
Recruitment 0.128 1.548 
Recruit through advertisements 0.062 0.521 
Direct recruit 0.123 1.292 
Recruit through educational 0.005 0.044 
institutions 
Informal recruitment 0.027 0.245 
Probation 0.048 0.561 0.010 0.097 
Formal dispute settlement -0.108 -1.115 -0.070 -0.661 
procedure 
0.557 0.772 0.797 
F-stat 38.193** 6.302** 4.863** 
"Standardized coefficients and /-values are reported.

""The regression models include industry and regional dummy variables as additional control variables.

*Statistically significant at the .05 level; **at the .01 level.

Table 5 presents regression results for the effects of HR practices on es­
tablishment performance. Here three models are presented. Model 1 pre­
sents results for a baseline regression in which control variables, establishment 
characteristics, and type of ownership variables were included. These vari­
ables accounted for 58.7% of the variance in the log value of sales. Union 
Inhi is the log of the number of employees, 5' is a vector of coefficients on HRj which are establishment-
level measures of HR practices, T)' is a vector of coefficients on the control variables that capture 
establishment characteristics, and e¡ is an error term. 
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presence, the value of capital, and the number of employees were all strongly 
significant. Of the three ownership types included in the regression, SOEs 
was the only type significant, indicating that in comparison with domestic 
POEs, these establishments were less productive. The coefficients on both 
the COEs and FOEs/JVEs were not significant. 
Models 2 and 3 then include HR practice variables in the regression. In 
Model 2, only composite forms of each variable are introduced, while Model 
3 includes the 15 individual HR practice variables. In Model 2, three of the 
composite HR variables were significant: training, recruitment, and formal 
dispute settiement procedure. While the training and recruitment variables 
were found to have a positive effect on sales per employee, the coefficient 
on the formal dispute setdement procedure variable was negative. In Model 
3, however, only the training variable remains significant once all variables 
are included. Overall, the results show limited support for the hypothesis 
that individual HR practices have a significant impact on performance 
among our sample of Chinese establishments. Our results do, however, sup­
port the proposition that investments in employee quality and skills are sig­
nificantiy associated with establishment level performance. This is an issue 
we return to in the following section. 
HR Practices and Labor Costs 
To what extent do the effects of HR practices on productivity translate into 
net positive effects on establishment performance? In order to begin to ad­
dress this issue, we seek to first assess the effect of HR practices on labor 
costs. In a longitudinal study of U.S. manufacturing establishments, Cap­
pelli and Neumark (2001) found evidence to support the proposition that 
the use of HR practices, linked to high performance work systems, were as­
sociated with a transfer of power to workers and, consequently, an increase 
in compensation. The effect on labor costs, they suggest, largely offsets the 
modest productivity gains associated with high performance work practices. 
To assess this proposition we regress two measures of labor costs—the log 
value of the total wages costs per employee, and the log value of nonwage 
labor costs per employee—on the same explanatory variables used to assess 
the impact of HR practices on establishment performance. The results of 
this analysis are reported in Table 6. 
Eew HR variables were found to have a substantial impact on wage costs. 
To begin with, it is worth noting that wage costs appear to bear some rela­
tionship to firm type with COEs reporting significantly lower wage costs than 
POEs. Turning to the HR practice variables, the range of nonwage benefits 
provided to employees was associated with lower wage costs per employee, 
suggesting establishments are able to use such benefits as an alternative to 
cash wage payments. This practice has been most closely associated with 
SOEs and former SOEs in China and other transition economies (Naugh-
ton 2007). The relationship between wage costs and the use of individual 
schemes, such as bonuses, was positive and highly significant. Recruitment 
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Table 6. HR Practices and Labor Costs (OLS Estimates'") 
Labor costs Wage costs Nonwage costs 
per employee per employee per employee 
Variable Beta t Beta t Beta T 
Control variables 
Union presence 0.010 0.058 0.084 0.537 -0.088 -0.459

Industry''

Region''

Establishment characteristics 
Ln (Value of capital equip.) 0.040 0.189 0.004 0.018 0.067 0.302 
Ln (No. of employees) -0.304 -1.624 -0.725** -3.656 -0.531** -2.706 
Ln (Establishment age) -0.055 -0.387 -0.027 -0.196 -0.013 -0.077 
Ownership 
State-owned -0.103 -0.643 0.020 0.122 -0.080 -0.461 
Collectively owned -0.436** -2.797 -0.280 -1.760 -0.377* -2.169 
Foreign-owned/joint venture -0.307 -1.867 -0.054 -0.372 -0.424* -2.385 
HR variables 
Training -0.110 -0.600 -0.126 -0.728 -0.176 -0.827 
Regular workers 0.123 0.902 0.165 1.272 -0.052 -0.349 
Benefits -0.105 -0.501 -0.307 -1.708 0.389 1.781 
Profit-based pay -0.179 -1.328 -0.083 -0.714 -0.177 -1.240 
Indiwdual incentive 0.665** 3.297 0.679** 3.813 0.361 1.702 
Other incentive scheme -0.291* -2.162 -0.002 -0.019 -0.302* -1.983 
Labor-management cooperation 0.051 0.455 -0.059 -0.488 0.102 0.865 
OH&S committee 0.260* 2.159 0.017 0.148 0.255** 1.992 
Recruit through advertisements 0.239 1.026 0.092 0.554 0.418 1.695 
Direct recruit -0.282 -1.965 0.009 0.062 -0.328* -2.174 
Recruit through educational institutions 0.518** 3.240 0.351** 2.606 0.341* 2.048 
Informal recruitment -0.365* -2.211 -0.195 -1.381 -0.614** -3.437 
Probation -0.227 -1.570 -0.091 -0.726 -0.188 -1.258 
Formal dispute settlement procedure 0.167 1.020 0.061 0.407 0.069 0.410 
IV 0.705 0.634 0.669 
P statistic 2.460* 2.190* 2.084* 
"All dependent variables are measured as natural logarithm of the original variable. Standardized beta

coefficients are reported.

''The regression models include industry and regional dummy variables as additional control variables.

*Statistically significant at the .05 level; **at the .01 level.

through educational institutions was also associated with significantly higher 
wage costs per worker, perhaps reflecting a greater use of highly skilled 
workers.^ 
A number of significant effects were also evident in relation to nonwage 
labor costs. In particular, the presence of an occupational health and safety 
committee, and recruitment through public advertising, were associated 
with higher levels of nonwage labor costs. By contrast, a reliance on direct 
recruitment and informal recruitment methods were both associated with 
lower levels of nonwage labor costs. 
'To assess this, we computed two separate measures of the proportion of skilled workers employed by 
the establishment (for all employees and for production workers only). Both of these variables were sig­
nificantly correlated with the use of recruitment through education institutions (p< 0.05). 
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Table 7. Human Resource Practices and Unit Labor Costs 
(OLS Estimates'') 
Variable Beta T 
Control variables 
Union presence 0.233 1.266

Industry*'

Region''

Establishment characteristics 
Ln (Value of capital equipment) 0.283 1.314 
Ln (No. of employees) 0.060 0.322 
Ln (Establishment age) -0.207 -1.487 
Ownership 
State-owned 0.072 0.448 
Collectively owned 0.365* 2.137 
Eoreign-owned/joint venture 0.197 1.162 
HR variables 
Training 0.616** 3.053 
Regular workers -0.154 -1.065 
Benefits -0.075 -0.344 
Profit-based pay 0.216 1.584 
Individual incentive -0.347 -1.692 
Other incentive scheme 0.113 0.857 
Labor-management cooperation -0.089 -0.777 
OH&S committee -0.182 -1.479 
Recruit through advertisements -0.396 -1.515 
Direct recruit 0.390** 2.676 
Recruit through educational institutions -0.328* -2.019 
Informal recruitment 0.448** 2.596 
Probation 0.290 1.912 
Formal dispute settlement procedure -0.396* -2.416 
R^ 0.718

E statistic 2.545**

"All dependent variables are measured as natural logarithm of the original

variable. Standardized beta coefficients are reported.

''The regression models include industry and regional dummy variables as ad­

ditional control variables.

*Statistically significant at the .05 level; **at the .01 level.

HR Practices and Unit Labor Costs 
Table 7 reports OLS regression results for unit labor costs. Following Cap­
pelli and Neumark (2001) we constructed a measure of unit labor costs as 
the ratio of sales per employee and total labor costs per employee. 
Here our results raise some questions about the impact of HR practices 
on the overall efficiency of production in the Chinese context. A number of 
specific HR practices were associated with significant reductions in unit 
labor costs, notably: individual incentive schemes, recruitment through ed­
ucation institutions, and the presence of a formal dispute settlement proce­
dure. The individual incentive variable is of particular interest to us because 
it was associated with significantly higher labor costs per employee. The 
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negative sign on the coefficient for this variable suggests that these addi­
tional costs were offset by improvements in production efficiency. The re­
duction in unit labor costs associated with relying on educational institutions 
to recruit labor is perhaps not surprising. As opposed to less formal forms of 
recruitment, this approach may provide an important device for assessing 
quality as well as recruiting specialist skills. The negative relationship be­
tween the adoption of a formal dispute setdement procedure and unit labor 
costs is also of considerable interest, particularly in the Chinese context 
where unions are generally viewed as dependent on management and un­
likely to provide an effective voice mechanism for worker interests. 
A number of HR variables were associated with higher unit labor costs. 
Most significandy, unit labor costs proved higher in establishments where a 
greater proportion of employees were engaged in training, suggesting that 
the return on these investments is not evident in the immediate period in 
which the cost is accrued. The uncertainty and often longer nature of re­
turns on human capital investments has been highlighted as one explana­
tion for the relatively low diffusion of high performance work practices 
(Erickson and Jacoby 2003). This might pose particular challenges in the 
Chinese context where product market and regulatory uncertainty are likely 
to influence the expected returns on such investments in future periods, 
particularly where reforms that induce higher levels of labor mobility have 
been introduced (Child and Tse 2001). 
Recruitment through educational institutions was associated with lower 
unit labor costs, whereas recruitment using informal or direct methods was 
associated with high unit labor costs. While these methods can be used at a 
lower cost (as our results indicated), they may be associated with lower qual­
ity labor, or may require firms to make larger investments upfront in on-the­
job training, which in turn, reduced workers' productivity. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The empirical literature examining the relationship between HR practices 
and workplace performance has proved highly influential in the industrial 
relations and HR research in developed countries, with only limited atten­
tion being placed on researching the nature of these interactions in diverse 
institutional and cultural environments. China presents an interesting set­
ting to test some of these well-established propositions for several reasons. 
Eirst and foremost, it has, over the course of the last thirty years, become a 
major economic power in the global economy, accounting for a growing 
proportion of world production and trade. Second, over the same period it 
has sought to gradually establish market institutions, including a properly 
functioning labor market and private ownership. The impact of this transi­
tion has been of considerable interest to researchers in a number of fields. 
One salient reason for this interest is to understand how institutional con­
straints and uncertainty may influence business strategies and the diffusion 
of Western business and management practices among domestic firms and 
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joint ventures (Wei and Lau 2008). Third, it presents a contrasting cultural 
environment in which Western management practices may not prove as ef­
fective as in their original setting. 
This study aimed to contribute to understanding how the enormous eco­
nomic transformation that has been taking place in China over the last 
three decades has influenced the adoption of Western-style HR practices 
and how these practices have shaped organizational outcomes including 
firm performance. 
Admittedly, the ILO ELFS data are unlikely to accurately reflect current 
HR practice—there have been further economic reforms and change over 
the last decade, all of which are likely to have had some consequences for 
the pattern of diffusion and take-up of HR in the period following the ad­
ministration of the ELFS survey. Nevertheless, the data we use provide some 
valuable insights for a number of reasons. First, HR research in China is still, 
to a large extent, characterized by an absence of bigb-quality data (Zhang 
and Lamond 2009). As previously noted, ELFS surveys are one of the few 
exceptions and have not previously been used to explore tbese issues. Sec­
ond, our review of the developments in China emphasized the industrial 
relations and labor market reforms during the 1980s and 1990s, the period 
immediately preceding the collection of our data. This provided a unique 
opportunity to systematically assess the diffusion of various practices during 
this time frame. It should also be emphasized that the 1990s were particu­
larly important years for Chinese HR and industrial relations in that an ex­
tensive overhaul of labor law provisions occurred, and the liquidation of 
inefficient SOEs was, to a large extent, completed by the turn of the century. 
This, coupled with the extensive discretion granted in the early 1990s to 
JVEs and private domestic and foreign enterprises to establish their man­
agement practices, render the 1978 to 2000 period a salient testing ground. 
Third, the data provide a rare opportunity to assess the validity of the propo­
sition that HR practices are likely to be associated with higher levels of firm 
performance in a transitional institutional and cultural context. Finally, we 
also believe that this study makes an important contribution to the more 
general HR-performance literature as it is one of the few examples assessing 
the effects of these practices on firm performance, costs, and productive ef­
ficiency (unit labor costs) simultaneously. 
The ELFS data suggest that by the end of the twentieth century, many 
Western HR practices had diffused widely across all types of firms, although 
to varying degrees. Of particular interest are HR practices within SOEs. 
Here, the data reveal that the adoption of new HR practices was often pres­
ent alongside older, more traditional, models. Some of the newer HR prac­
tices, such as profit-based pay and individual incentives, were introduced as 
part of the reforms made during the late 1990s that were intended to raise 
productivity and efficiency. Similarly, while SOEs were more likely to employ 
workers on regular contracts, the data reveal a substantial proportion of 
workers in all firm types were employed on fixed-term contracts or on a 
part-time basis. Yet, these new practices were more prevalent in private 
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sector firms or jo in t venture arrangements. In the case of some practices, 
such as quality circles and jo in t consultative committees, these practices 
were absent in the overwhelming majority of establishments irrespective of 
whether they were part of a domestic or international enterprise, and 
whether privately or publicly owned. In short, the data provide a picture of 
a diffuse yet uneven take-up of Western-style practices, which very often co­
existed with traditional models. A typical example of this blend was the ex­
tensive use of nonwage benefits in both SOEs and JVEs. 
The analysis we presented in relation to the effects of such practices on 
organizational outcomes seems to suggest that few individual practices have 
strong effects on establishment performance in the Chinese context. The 
most consistent result across the different models presented here is that the 
proport ion of employees participating in either on-the-job or formal train­
ing programs was associated with higher performance, measured as sales 
per employee. It should be emphasized that we have not tested for possible 
interactions among HR practices to assess the extent of "bundling" or com­
plementarities between practices. Nor did we assess, for example, whether 
such practices had more significant effects in certain industries or types of 
establishments. 
More significantiy, a number of HR practices were found to be associated 
with higher labor costs. O u r analysis indicated that these cost effects appear 
to reflect the relationship between the investments in skill and labor costs. 
These results were broadly consistent with the findings of Cappelli and Neu­
mark (2001) and Way (2002). Cappelli and Neumark suggest that this was 
largely a consequence of the fact that high-performance work practices in­
volve a transfer of power from management to employees, which also al­
lowed employees to capture the additional productivity associated with HR 
practices in the form of higher wages. Our results provide qualified support 
for this view. In particular, HR practices seem to influence the cost structure 
of product ion through increasing nonwage labor costs in the form of addi­
tional investments in skills in the process of establishing practices designed 
to facilitate employee involvement and incentive schemes in tended to in­
duce discretionary effort. 
Although our results suggest the relationship between HR practices and 
labor costs is more complicated than what was originally proposed by Cap­
pelli and Neumark, our overall conclusion in relation to the net efficiency 
effects of HR practices is somewhat similar. While investments in HR prac­
tices may have some positive effects on productivity, the net gains are at best 
slight, if at all positive, once cost effects are offset against productivity gains. 
O n e result that is of particular interest is the negative relationship we found 
between the adoption of a formal dispute procedure and unit labor cost. 
This would suggest that where present these processes appear to operate ef­
fectively. Although Chinese unions are generally viewed as being ineffective 
in representing worker interests (Friedman and Lee 2010), this result raises 
the possibility that unions may play some positive role in workplace dispute 
resolution (Ge 2007). 
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In interpreting our results, keep in mind the limitations of our study. The 
original survey was not designed to measure the effects of HR practices on 
firm performance. As with any data set that was created for purposes other 
than its current use, we were limited in the selection of our HR variables by 
the items that were available in the original ELES survey. This in turn cre­
ated problems as some potentially relevant variables were missing. Eor ex­
ample, the effect of self-managed or autonomous work teams, an important 
variable for both the HR and "high performance work systems" literature 
on performance and labor costs, could not be measured. Significandy, and 
as we have already noted, the ELES survey is a cross-sectional data set that 
has only limited value in explaining causal relationships over time. 
Despite these limitations our findings have several strengths and make a 
significant contribution to the HR-performance debate. Eirst, by using ob­
jective measures and by having multiple respondents answer different ques­
tions we were able to avoid common method variance problems. Second, as 
previously noted, the sample is considerably larger than in most other re­
search examining HR practices in China. Third, the data set is across indus­
tries and regions thus allowing us to test the importance of variation across 
production contexts while controlling for several key variables. 
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